For context, the author of the linked post, Sam James, is a Gentoo developer.
Anyway, this is a disaster. It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix. Who knows how many shared hosting providers were hacked with this.
It's also worrying that it seems there's no communication between the kernel security team and distribution maintainers. One would hope that the former would notify the latter, but apparently it's the responsibility of whoever finds the vulnerability.
As a user and admin I disagree. Makes one appreciate what a masterful bit of lexical-engineering “Responsible” Disclosure is, kinda like “Secure” (from me, not forme) Boot — “Responsible” Disclosure is 100% about reputation-management for the various corporation/foundation middleman entities sitting between me and my computer.
Those groups don't care that my individual computer is vulnerable but about nobody being able to say “RHEL is vulnerable” or “Ubuntu is vulnerable”. The vulnerability exists for me either way, and I'd rather have the chance to know about it and minimize risk than to be surprised by the fix and hope nothing bad happened in that meantime.
Immediate public disclosure is the only choice that isn't irresponsible as far as I'm concerned.
So if I found a vulnerability that lets hackers withdraw withdraw all the money in your account without a trail on where the money went, you'd be fine with them disclosing it to the public at the same time as the bank learns about it?
Even when there is no known use case of the attack (other than the security researcher's)?
> The vulnerability exists for me either way, and I'd rather have the chance to know about it and minimize risk
By the time you hear about it, the money could be gone because 1000 hackers heard about it from the researcher before you did.
> than to be surprised by the fix and hope nothing bad happened in that meantime.
You're missing the point (not sure if you're just being dense on purpose or genuinely don't understand...). If you're bank would just return the money then its not a good analogy. If someone gains root access to your machine, presumably they can do damage that can't be undone. In other words, to continue the bank analogy, they would take all your money and you would have no way of getting it back. Presumably, you would not be ok with this. And even if, for some weird reason, you were ok with that, 99.9% of all other people would not be ok with it.
Respectfully, I don't think they're missing the point. Banking, as an institution, has its flaws, but deposit insurance isn't one of them. These vulnerabilities exist whether or not they follow specific disclosure rituals, and systems should be deployed with defense-in-depth so that one privilege-escalation flaw is a recoverable event. Inventing tortured counterfactual analogies doesn't change the basic thrust of the poster's point: the account is insured, so getting drained by an attacker is not a fatal problem. Of course people should still take steps to prevent that from happening, but that doesn't mean prevention is (or should be) the only cure.
The disclosure doesn't appear very "full". Looks like this was slipped into mainline linux among dozens of other mostly-irrelevant "CVEs" with nobody highlighting the fact that it is in fact dirty-cow-on-steroids.
Or is everyone expected to upgrade and reboot every 48 hours for all eternity and just deal with potential regressions all the time?
I think this reflects poorly on the original reporters. If you have a weaponized 700-byte universal local root exploit script ready to go, perhaps you should coordinate with major distros for patches to be available before unleashing it on the world. No matter how "veteran" you are.
Those groups care about whether millions of computers are vulnerable, likely including your computer. If "immediate public disclosure" was done in all cases every vuln would be exploited and patches would be much lower quality. Shortening the disclosure timeline might be a good idea, 90 days is starting to feel long.
Researchers are under no obligation to engage in coordinated disclosure and are free to sell 0day for profit. Just fyi. Be glad it was disclosed at all. Be glad a patch was available prior to release.
If they want to be seen as responsible rather than opportunistic, then yeah, they should do a proper coordinated disclosure.
Sure, they have no legal obligation to disclose, but we all also have no legal obligation to buy their services. Blacklisting bad actors like this is the right move to discourage this kind of behavior.
Who cares about how you are seen when you are selling 0day for big bucks? The bad actor makes more money than the 'legitimate' one without breaking any law. Punishing someone who didn't alert distros despite a patch being available encourages the company to simply find flaws and sell them for profit - it pays more to begin with.
If they want to take advantage of disclosure for marketing, they're either going to need to accept the norms around responsible disclosure, or they're going to need to accept how shirking those norms will come off. That's life in society. Sometimes it's annoying and sometimes it doesn't feel rational, but these norms have been negotiated throughout the history of our industry and are the way they are for reasons good and bad.
I just don't see the point in complaining about how shirking the norms of your industry will make you look irresponsible. I don't really care that they could have decided to sell the vulnerability instead. It isn't material.
It is absolutely not true that viable commercial vulnerability labs need to "accept the norms around responsible disclosure". There are no such norms. "Responsible disclosure" is an Orwellian term cooked up between @Stake and Microsoft and other large vendors to coerce researchers into synchronizing with vendor release schedules. It was fantastically successful at that, and it's worth pushing back on at every opportunity.
Tavis Ormandy dropped Zenbleed right onto Twitter. He's doing fine. You can blacklist him if you want; I imagine he's not going to notice.
Microsoft's policy is: "if you contact us with a vulnerability, you automatically agree to the terms of our responsible disclosure policy", which includes waiting 30 days after patch was created, and says nothing about how long that process takes.
There is actually no way to give them a friendly heads up, and then do your own thing. The only way not to be bound is by not sending them any notification at all...
Those norms do not exist. Those are people asking companies to do stuff to benefit the person complaining for free, and many companies will not do that.
It seems to me you're unaware of them, but there are strong norms around disclosure. They've been discussed for decades. It is the expectation that vendors would be notified in a scenario like this.
No, there are users who want those to be norms. Qualified researchers happily sell substantive vulns to people who pay (Governments/Cellebrite and companies like that) enough to quell any complaint.
Which is again, irrelevant to the question of how disclosure works and what expectations there are around it because that is not disclosure and is not what was being discussed.
I'm pretty sure they have a legal obligation in most jurisdictions not to sell 0days for profit.
And they absolutely have a moral obligation to do things in a way to minimize damage and impact to other people's systems. (I'm not saying "responsible disclosure" is the correct way to do that, but hoarding vulnerabilities and exploits and selling them to the highest bidder certainly isn't.)
They should have a legal obligation to engage in coordinated/responsible disclosure, and it should be a crime to sell or disclose a 0day to anyone other than a state-designated security organization or the vendor/provider.
If it won’t be handled through criminal law then it’ll be handled through civil litigation: Anyone who was exploited as a result of this disclosure should sue the discloser for contributing to the damage they’ve suffered.
The Linux kernel is not usable as a security boundary, so anyone who wants to do "shared hosting" and not be hacked needs to use something else, like gVisor or firecracker VMs
The only important system that uses it as a security boundary is Android and there is mitigated by the fact that APKs need user approval, plus strict SELinux and seccomp policy plus the GrapheneOS hardening, and in this case the mitigations succeeded (https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35110-grapheneos-is-protect...)
I'm quite sure there are many application hosting providers which rely on container runtime such as runC (default runtime of containerd/Docker), and a shared kernel between users.
Expecting people to do the right thing is a fundamental issue here. Why would you ever expect for all of vulnerabilities to be disclosed privately? There's very little actual incentive to do this.
I'm honestly unaware of what systems could be put in place to prevent this but expecting people to always do the right thing is fantasy level thinking. I mean I bet the disclosers thought they were doing the right thing, hence why it's a bad thing to rely on.
The worst thing would be to exploit or sell it for profit. Instead of that, publicizing the exploit is closer to neutral–good in my books, that did trigger a really quick reaction from the different actors to patch their kernels and systems
Imagine how much quicker the distros would have reacted if they were given a heads up a month ago. But, sure, I guess kudos to this company for not being actively criminal, and merely bumblingly incompetent and overly eager to get their marketing pitch out the door.
Why don't all these distro maintainers add their own back doors, and mine crypto off our machines without our knowledge? Surely, there is some legal fine print they can add that would let them do that. There is very little incentive for them to maintain these systems, given how thankless and underpaid the work is.
If it's not a crime I see no reason not to work with partner nations to build responsible disclosure into a legal framework everywhere because it pretty obviously should be.
You know companies are allowed to pay people to find vulns, and pay people bug bounties?
Instead of that, you’d rather make the law compel free individuals to limit their speech, or to hand over their work to big companies privately, so big companies can save money?
That doesn’t sound like a nice future, if it’s even enforceable at all.
Basic care would involve making sure the patches had made it into the wild before ending the embargo, and nagging the relevant parties if not.
Edit: As of this writing, most distros including Redhat, Fedora, Debian Stable, do not have patches available in the package repos, though they're being actively worked on.
Not true, if there’s any evidence of the exploit being used in the wild, it’s much more responsible to release immediately.
Considering that the patches have been available for a while, someone surely reversed what they were for and was actually exploiting this in the wild.
In the age of AI, I’d argue that “responsible disclosure” is dead. Arguably even in closed source projects. Just ask Claude to do a diff between the previous version and to see whether anything fixed in there could have had security implications.
We’re not there yet, but very soon the only way to responsibly disclose a vulnerability will be immediately.
But they didn't release immediately -- they waited a month, but forgot to tell the distros, and forgot to check if waiting a month had actually lead to distros picking up the patches and shipping them.
Patches are still in the process of landing in most major distros as of the time of this writing. Most users are not able to get an update through their distro's packaging mechanisms.
It's a local vulnerability at least. How many people do you let log in to your router?
With the way linux is used these days, I'd guess the number of systems with untrusted local users is pretty limited. Even with shared hosting, you generally have root in your VM or container anyway. Unless this enables an escape from that?
Still the risk that people who run "curl | bash" without care could get bitten, but usually its "curl | sudo bash" anyway...
> With the way linux is used these days, I'd guess the number of systems with untrusted local users is pretty limited
Things like HPC clusters are multiuser & don't entirely trust their users. If they did we wouldn't need users/groups/permissions etc in the first place.
> Even with shared hosting, you generally have root in your VM or container
Lots of shared hosters don't use VMs or containers. It's some arbitrary number of people logging in to a shared system, each one with a home directory under /home/THE_USER_NAME. i've had several such hosters over the years (thankfully not right now, though).
Partly they already have enough on their plate. It's up to the reporter to pick how to handle the disclosure, and unless a specific maintainer chooses to handle it, the Linux security team clearly says they won't.
Partly they have a strong belief that all kernel bugs are vulnerabilities and all vulnerabilities are just bugs; sometimes taken to the extreme in both ways (on one hand this case where the vulnerability is almost ignored; on the other hand, I saw cases where a VM panic that could be triggered only by a misbehaving host—which could just choose to stop executing the VM—was given a CVE).
Seems a little crazy. Somebody should evaluate blast radius and do appropriate distro notifications in a case like this (I presume the impact was part of the disclosure, so not much extra work).
You know the linux kernel is a free software project right? If you think “somebody should” do a thing but you aren’t prepared to do it yourself then you should maybe ask for a full refund.
I think it’s reasonable to expect folks in the security community who go to the trouble of creating a website detailing security vulnerabilities in specific listed software to pre-notify the security teams of that software. The CopyFail website calls out Ubuntu and Red Hat specifically, but apparently the author of the site did not inform them of the issue?
But even if you think making unethical decisions in personal self interest is something no one should be criticized for, surely the Linux kernel team ought to have some process for notifying the top distributions of an upcoming LPE, just out of practicality.
In what sense do you believe that the reporter did not notify the security team of the relevant software? The vulnerability is in the kernel. Reporter responsibly disclosed using the kernel’s security report mechanism and waited until a patch was ready.
Distros are downstream of kernel, that doesn’t entitle them to expect to be contacted directly by every security reporter. That’s not on them. Distros that are big enough should be plugged into the linux security team for notifications.
Security researchers cannot be held responsible for broken lines of communication within the org charts of projects that they study. They’re providing a valuable public service already, how much more do you want?
It is suggested that they out of an abundance of caution and 5 or 6 emails. If this is entirely to much to expect we can always help them by mandating that they spend 6 figures annually meeting a much more robust set of requirements that will include notifying all possible affected parties down to Hannah Montana Linux devs if any still exist.
Any strategy that assumes that the rest of the world is functional or makes you personally responsible for fixing all of it is equally broken but there is a reasonable middle ground and sending a few more emails lies within it
> we can always help them by mandating that they spend 6 figures
Who’s we? Mandate with what authority?
AWS and GCP are downstream another level. Should the reporter also have worked with them? And their customers? And the customers of their customers?
IMO this whole discussion seems like people are annoyed by the security researchers doing god’s work and wish they didn’t exist or think that they should be fully subservient to the projects and companies they are helping for free. The bugs were there before the researchers revealed them!!
Without taking a position on the disclosure mechanics: any hosting provider hacked with this was already playing to lose. It is not OK to run competing untrusted tenant workloads under a single shared kernel. Kernel LPEs are not rare. This was a particularly simple and portable one, but the underlying raw capability is a CNE commodity.
Argument from uncertainty is not a good way to reason about this.
I could equally ask: "Who knows how many attackers learned about this vulnerability from this disclosure, and used it before the distributions fixed it?"
Yes, you could. Thats the core of my point: there is no Right way to handle vulnerability disclosure. There are many competing factors, most of them have major elements of uncertainty because you can’t know who knows what or how various projects or stakeholders will react.
So maybe folks should take a break from the kind of armchair quarterbacking that this was “incredibly irresponsible”, as was done upthread, or that the researchers should be blacklisted for life, as a parallel commenter stated.
and its your opinion that it doesn't. Shall we continue stating the obvious? We are communicating using glyphs. This language is English. We are on Hacker News. This branch of the conversation is extremely unproductive.
I asked a question and you replied with a statement. Your statement didn’t frame itself as an opinion but as fact.
The hilarious bit is that the idea that they needed to coordinate is clearly broken even in just this example. They did give prior notice to the Linux developers, who issued a patch. And they’re still getting raked over the coals in this comment page by armchair quarterbacks who have decided they needed to coordinate with specific distros. If they’d coordinated with those distros, somebody would have a pet distro that didn’t make the cut and they’d be pissed about that.
There are risks no matter how they do it, and there will be people who are pissed no matter how they do it. Security researchers don’t owe anybody a specific methodology.
you seemed to suggest with your initial statement that any disclosure was acceptable as people would have been using the exploit prior to the disclosure. I don't think that's a strong argument given now the initial people who were using the exploit prior to disclosure are now joined by people who have learned of the exploit as a consequence of the disclosure happening before all the distribtions were ready.
So I feel like the argument reduces into "why is it a problem that now anyone could exploit it, if some people were exploiting it already". Which imho isn't a sensible argument because the issue is clearly the amount of people capable of using the exploit for nefarious purposes, which has increased.
Idk why you felt the need to use quotes to wrap something I didn’t say, and that is a pretty uncharitable attempt at reframing my question. If you wanted a quote, here’s what I’d say:
“Because we can’t know if there was exploitation by existing parties who had discovered the vulnerability on their own, there are upsides to disclosing earlier so that affected users can take mitigating steps and review their systems for indicators of compromise. Additionally, the more projects the researchers pull into the loop for coordinated disclosure, the higher the likelihood that they further leak the vulnerability to more attackers.”
Idk why you felt the need to use quotes to wrap something I didn’t say. Despite the fact I didn't say that, its a much more interesting argument than your original statement implies and it is unfortunate we didn't start there.
However the issue is that we cannot know if the attack space has been broadened or lessened as a consequence of this disclosure, because of how eager it was. If it wasn't eager then we could much more comfortable in suggesting that the attack space has probably been reduced.
Given the exploit had been living in the linux code base undetected for so long in the first place, I think its fair to state that disclosing the exploit prior to the distributions being ready and given the distributions are the principal attack vector of the exploit: that the researcher has made the situation worse and should reflect on their actions.
… I used quotes to wrap something that I was saying. I even called out that it was something I was saying, as a more accurate variant of what you’d claimed I meant.
and I prefaced my quotes with the statement "So I feel like the argument reduces into". I mean, idk what punctuation I'm supposed to use there that doesn't offend you, but I just figured we can all read words and it was clear that I wasn't saying you said that, but rather, as I read the argument it was reducable to that and I took issue with that potential reduction.
The idea about the available exploit space and how the actors within it might, or might not move is a much more interesting avenue of conversation and I thank you for elaborating on your initial comment. <3
I do however feel that its hard to be confident about whether or not the attack space has been increased or reduced as a consequence of the eager disclosure. I feel we could make the case either way.
> Anyway, this is a disaster. It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix. Who knows how many shared hosting providers were hacked with this.
Maybe it is irresponsible how little attention we pay to software security. Maybe, software developers of all kind should spend an entire year not developing any features at all, but fix all the tech debt of 30 years instead.
Yes, that sounds revolutionary, but I do not see an alternative in an age where all you need to find kernel bugs of this scale with AI agents.
> It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix.
Yes, this was clearly a marketing stunt to promote Xint code.
I, for one, will never use Xint code and will advise everyone to never use it. To anyone working there: enjoy your 15 minutes, I hope this backfires right in your face.
Imagine an ignorant response like this from Apple? One of the most short sighted comments I've seen on HN in some time. And the double down! A true master class in misunderstanding the issue and the entire FOSS ecosystem in two sentences.
It does? The disclosure even says the concern for single user systems is very low. If someone has access to your single user system, remote or otherwise, you’ve already lost on the sort of device people would be switching from windows to Linux on.
`nosuid` and probably `nodev` should IMO be the default filesystem mount options.
`/dev` is already a special devtmpfs and the initrd minimal /dev can just explicitly mount the initrd tmpfs rootfs with `dev` and `suid` if necessary.
Letting SUID binaries just "exist" anywhere is a stupendous security issue. What if you mount some external storage medium, how are you to verify that none of the SUID binaries on that block device are malicious.
Additionally, this exploit appears to only work if the user executing the SUID binary can also read the SUID binary. There's no reason for non-root users to have read on a SUID binary.
NixOS does this correctly. No SUID in the normal package installation directory `/nix/store` and no package leakage outside of that no `nosuid` can safety be used on all other mountpoints. The exception is just a single-purpose `/run/wrappers.$hash` directory that safety contains executable ONLY SUID wrappers.
> Note that for Linux kernel vulnerabilities, unless the reporter chooses
to bring it to the linux-distros ML, there is no heads-up to
distributions.
Why would they imply it is incumbent on the reporter to liaise with distributions? That seems to assume a high level of familiarity with the linux project. Vulnerability reporters shouldn’t be responsible for directly working with every downstream consumer of the linux kernel, what’s the limiting principal there? Should the reporter also be directly talking to all device manufacturers that use Linux on their machines?
IMO reporter did more than enough by responsibly disclosing it to linux and waiting for a patch to land.
Aren’t there people in the linux project itself with authority over and responsibility for security vulnerabilities? One would think they would be the ones notifying downstream distros…
```As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the “linux-distros” mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code’s maintainers and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand the requirements that contacting “linux-distros” will impose on you and the kernel community. ```
The reporter took time to check and mention on their website specific distributions Ubuntu/RHEL/SUSE. One would have thought reporting to security teams of at least those would be responsible.
If you can't write it down, why would you expect it to be universal and enforceable? Different cultures exist and have different opinions on what "decency' means, after all.
A security researcher's ethical obligations are to protect users over vendors (barring any contractual agreement in place). From what has been discussed in this thread, they meet that bar.
Sure, they could have gone the extra mile to ensure the distros were in a good place to patch before they published the exploit. That's a kindness you can wish for, but don't disparage them for not going that extra mile. It's a bonus.
It's also possible that it simply didn't occur to them to do so this time. There's certainly lessons to be learned either way. I don't know that the right lessons will emerge from hostility.
> If you can't write it down, why would you expect it to be universal and enforceable?
and this is the problem. It used to be the case that if you were smart enough to find an exploit you were also smart enough to realise what would happen if you irresponsibly disclosed it. I guess these tools have made that pattern no longer apply.
From my point of view, they told the kernel security team which is in charge of fixing this. If it’s important for them to tell other people, then it should’ve been written down and further reiterated when they made their report.
The skills to detect code exploits is not the same as the skills to navigate an informal org chart to the satisfaction of an amorphous audience if end users (i.e. us on HN).
That said… as they are a company that supposedly specializes in this field, and is trying to sell a product, I do believe they should do better. Right now, I don’t have much confidence in their product.
Yes :) The blackhatter would obviously sit on it until they can sell it or use it, the whitehatter collaborate the kernel and distros to patch, and the greyhatter argues on HN whether the latest *fail was responsible enough or not.
The reporter made a website explicitly calling out Ubuntu, RedHat, Amazon, and SUSE but didn’t notify them, and you think that’s reasonable? That they might not have known those distributions are downstream from the kernel team?
Just for what it's worth, I just pushed an eBPF-based workaround for people who are running kernels in which AF_ALG is linked directly into the kernel and not as a module: https://github.com/Dabbleam/CVE-2026-31431-mitigation
I am running this in production right now and it mitigates the attack, with no unexpected side-effects as far as I can see.
This workaround only applies to kernels with the impacted code compiled as a module. RHEL, Fedora, and Gentoo (we use a modified Fedora config) all are configured to build this in directly. Without a patch or config change (as Sam from Gentoo was alluding to), those distributions remain vulnerable.
Anyway, this is a disaster. It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix. Who knows how many shared hosting providers were hacked with this.
It's also worrying that it seems there's no communication between the kernel security team and distribution maintainers. One would hope that the former would notify the latter, but apparently it's the responsibility of whoever finds the vulnerability.
As a user and admin I disagree. Makes one appreciate what a masterful bit of lexical-engineering “Responsible” Disclosure is, kinda like “Secure” (from me, not forme) Boot — “Responsible” Disclosure is 100% about reputation-management for the various corporation/foundation middleman entities sitting between me and my computer.
Those groups don't care that my individual computer is vulnerable but about nobody being able to say “RHEL is vulnerable” or “Ubuntu is vulnerable”. The vulnerability exists for me either way, and I'd rather have the chance to know about it and minimize risk than to be surprised by the fix and hope nothing bad happened in that meantime.
Immediate public disclosure is the only choice that isn't irresponsible as far as I'm concerned.
Even when there is no known use case of the attack (other than the security researcher's)?
> The vulnerability exists for me either way, and I'd rather have the chance to know about it and minimize risk
By the time you hear about it, the money could be gone because 1000 hackers heard about it from the researcher before you did.
> than to be surprised by the fix and hope nothing bad happened in that meantime.
Hope is not a good strategy here.
That’s what you’re saying here.
https://x.com/spendergrsec/status/2049566830771970483
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2026042214-CVE-20...
Or is everyone expected to upgrade and reboot every 48 hours for all eternity and just deal with potential regressions all the time?
I think this reflects poorly on the original reporters. If you have a weaponized 700-byte universal local root exploit script ready to go, perhaps you should coordinate with major distros for patches to be available before unleashing it on the world. No matter how "veteran" you are.
(This bug does not technically require a reboot to mitigate).
Using quotes around something where you’re actually doing a strawman paraphrase of another commenter you disagree with is bad form.
Ubuntu/RHEL is vulnerable and so are most Linux users by extension.
> Is your software AI-era safe?
> Copy Fail was surfaced by Xint Code about an hour of scan time against the Linux crypto/ subsystem. [...]
> [Try Xint Code]
More chaos makes their product seem even more attractive.
Sure, they have no legal obligation to disclose, but we all also have no legal obligation to buy their services. Blacklisting bad actors like this is the right move to discourage this kind of behavior.
I just don't see the point in complaining about how shirking the norms of your industry will make you look irresponsible. I don't really care that they could have decided to sell the vulnerability instead. It isn't material.
Tavis Ormandy dropped Zenbleed right onto Twitter. He's doing fine. You can blacklist him if you want; I imagine he's not going to notice.
There is actually no way to give them a friendly heads up, and then do your own thing. The only way not to be bound is by not sending them any notification at all...
And they absolutely have a moral obligation to do things in a way to minimize damage and impact to other people's systems. (I'm not saying "responsible disclosure" is the correct way to do that, but hoarding vulnerabilities and exploits and selling them to the highest bidder certainly isn't.)
This is how society needs to work.
it wasn't sold for profit, it was openly disclosed.
> And they absolutely have a moral obligation to do things in a way to minimize damage and impact to other people's systems.
All that "responsible disclosure" does is keep people from demanding better.
If it won’t be handled through criminal law then it’ll be handled through civil litigation: Anyone who was exploited as a result of this disclosure should sue the discloser for contributing to the damage they’ve suffered.
The only important system that uses it as a security boundary is Android and there is mitigated by the fact that APKs need user approval, plus strict SELinux and seccomp policy plus the GrapheneOS hardening, and in this case the mitigations succeeded (https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35110-grapheneos-is-protect...)
I'm honestly unaware of what systems could be put in place to prevent this but expecting people to always do the right thing is fantasy level thinking. I mean I bet the disclosers thought they were doing the right thing, hence why it's a bad thing to rely on.
edit: spelling/grammer.
But publishing a working exploit together with the disclosure before patches are available is really really irresponsible, maybe even criminal.
And no, the proposed mitigations don't help with half of the distributions out there...
What’s your theory here? What crime?
But it’s not the law anywhere I’m aware of today, and I’d not support it becoming a law.
Instead of that, you’d rather make the law compel free individuals to limit their speech, or to hand over their work to big companies privately, so big companies can save money?
That doesn’t sound like a nice future, if it’s even enforceable at all.
Edit: As of this writing, most distros including Redhat, Fedora, Debian Stable, do not have patches available in the package repos, though they're being actively worked on.
Considering that the patches have been available for a while, someone surely reversed what they were for and was actually exploiting this in the wild.
In the age of AI, I’d argue that “responsible disclosure” is dead. Arguably even in closed source projects. Just ask Claude to do a diff between the previous version and to see whether anything fixed in there could have had security implications.
We’re not there yet, but very soon the only way to responsibly disclose a vulnerability will be immediately.
With the way linux is used these days, I'd guess the number of systems with untrusted local users is pretty limited. Even with shared hosting, you generally have root in your VM or container anyway. Unless this enables an escape from that?
Still the risk that people who run "curl | bash" without care could get bitten, but usually its "curl | sudo bash" anyway...
Things like HPC clusters are multiuser & don't entirely trust their users. If they did we wouldn't need users/groups/permissions etc in the first place.
Lots of shared hosters don't use VMs or containers. It's some arbitrary number of people logging in to a shared system, each one with a home directory under /home/THE_USER_NAME. i've had several such hosters over the years (thankfully not right now, though).
So containers don't protect you, only a VM.
Partly they have a strong belief that all kernel bugs are vulnerabilities and all vulnerabilities are just bugs; sometimes taken to the extreme in both ways (on one hand this case where the vulnerability is almost ignored; on the other hand, I saw cases where a VM panic that could be triggered only by a misbehaving host—which could just choose to stop executing the VM—was given a CVE).
But even if you think making unethical decisions in personal self interest is something no one should be criticized for, surely the Linux kernel team ought to have some process for notifying the top distributions of an upcoming LPE, just out of practicality.
Distros are downstream of kernel, that doesn’t entitle them to expect to be contacted directly by every security reporter. That’s not on them. Distros that are big enough should be plugged into the linux security team for notifications.
Security researchers cannot be held responsible for broken lines of communication within the org charts of projects that they study. They’re providing a valuable public service already, how much more do you want?
Any strategy that assumes that the rest of the world is functional or makes you personally responsible for fixing all of it is equally broken but there is a reasonable middle ground and sending a few more emails lies within it
AWS and GCP are downstream another level. Should the reporter also have worked with them? And their customers? And the customers of their customers?
IMO this whole discussion seems like people are annoyed by the security researchers doing god’s work and wish they didn’t exist or think that they should be fully subservient to the projects and companies they are helping for free. The bugs were there before the researchers revealed them!!
Yes it does. That's how it's always been done and distros can ship a fix well before it ends up in a kernel release.
Most people in tech think like the techie in this comic strip.
https://xkcd.com/538/
I could equally ask: "Who knows how many attackers learned about this vulnerability from this disclosure, and used it before the distributions fixed it?"
So maybe folks should take a break from the kind of armchair quarterbacking that this was “incredibly irresponsible”, as was done upthread, or that the researchers should be blacklisted for life, as a parallel commenter stated.
The hilarious bit is that the idea that they needed to coordinate is clearly broken even in just this example. They did give prior notice to the Linux developers, who issued a patch. And they’re still getting raked over the coals in this comment page by armchair quarterbacks who have decided they needed to coordinate with specific distros. If they’d coordinated with those distros, somebody would have a pet distro that didn’t make the cut and they’d be pissed about that.
There are risks no matter how they do it, and there will be people who are pissed no matter how they do it. Security researchers don’t owe anybody a specific methodology.
So I feel like the argument reduces into "why is it a problem that now anyone could exploit it, if some people were exploiting it already". Which imho isn't a sensible argument because the issue is clearly the amount of people capable of using the exploit for nefarious purposes, which has increased.
“Because we can’t know if there was exploitation by existing parties who had discovered the vulnerability on their own, there are upsides to disclosing earlier so that affected users can take mitigating steps and review their systems for indicators of compromise. Additionally, the more projects the researchers pull into the loop for coordinated disclosure, the higher the likelihood that they further leak the vulnerability to more attackers.”
However the issue is that we cannot know if the attack space has been broadened or lessened as a consequence of this disclosure, because of how eager it was. If it wasn't eager then we could much more comfortable in suggesting that the attack space has probably been reduced.
Given the exploit had been living in the linux code base undetected for so long in the first place, I think its fair to state that disclosing the exploit prior to the distributions being ready and given the distributions are the principal attack vector of the exploit: that the researcher has made the situation worse and should reflect on their actions.
The idea about the available exploit space and how the actors within it might, or might not move is a much more interesting avenue of conversation and I thank you for elaborating on your initial comment. <3
I do however feel that its hard to be confident about whether or not the attack space has been increased or reduced as a consequence of the eager disclosure. I feel we could make the case either way.
It's an advertisement for an unpatched critical exploit and apparently some kind of infosec company.
Maybe it is irresponsible how little attention we pay to software security. Maybe, software developers of all kind should spend an entire year not developing any features at all, but fix all the tech debt of 30 years instead.
Yes, that sounds revolutionary, but I do not see an alternative in an age where all you need to find kernel bugs of this scale with AI agents.
Maybe a decade of corporations with revenue in the billions, paying peanuts and coffee money, for critical vulnerability disclosures made it....
Yes, this was clearly a marketing stunt to promote Xint code.
I, for one, will never use Xint code and will advise everyone to never use it. To anyone working there: enjoy your 15 minutes, I hope this backfires right in your face.
It is a really really bad look for Linux, puts a bit of water on all hype around switching from Windows.
No OS is perfect. The awkward rollout for this bug fix is proof of that.
Said no one ever...present post excluded :-))
Letting SUID binaries just "exist" anywhere is a stupendous security issue. What if you mount some external storage medium, how are you to verify that none of the SUID binaries on that block device are malicious.
Additionally, this exploit appears to only work if the user executing the SUID binary can also read the SUID binary. There's no reason for non-root users to have read on a SUID binary.
NixOS does this correctly. No SUID in the normal package installation directory `/nix/store` and no package leakage outside of that no `nosuid` can safety be used on all other mountpoints. The exception is just a single-purpose `/run/wrappers.$hash` directory that safety contains executable ONLY SUID wrappers.
Why would they imply it is incumbent on the reporter to liaise with distributions? That seems to assume a high level of familiarity with the linux project. Vulnerability reporters shouldn’t be responsible for directly working with every downstream consumer of the linux kernel, what’s the limiting principal there? Should the reporter also be directly talking to all device manufacturers that use Linux on their machines?
IMO reporter did more than enough by responsibly disclosing it to linux and waiting for a patch to land.
Aren’t there people in the linux project itself with authority over and responsibility for security vulnerabilities? One would think they would be the ones notifying downstream distros…
https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html
```As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the “linux-distros” mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code’s maintainers and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand the requirements that contacting “linux-distros” will impose on you and the kernel community. ```
Everyone involved here failed to do the right thing, and hiding behind the lack of written words is weak sauce.
A security researcher's ethical obligations are to protect users over vendors (barring any contractual agreement in place). From what has been discussed in this thread, they meet that bar.
Sure, they could have gone the extra mile to ensure the distros were in a good place to patch before they published the exploit. That's a kindness you can wish for, but don't disparage them for not going that extra mile. It's a bonus.
It's also possible that it simply didn't occur to them to do so this time. There's certainly lessons to be learned either way. I don't know that the right lessons will emerge from hostility.
and this is the problem. It used to be the case that if you were smart enough to find an exploit you were also smart enough to realise what would happen if you irresponsibly disclosed it. I guess these tools have made that pattern no longer apply.
The skills to detect code exploits is not the same as the skills to navigate an informal org chart to the satisfaction of an amorphous audience if end users (i.e. us on HN).
That said… as they are a company that supposedly specializes in this field, and is trying to sell a product, I do believe they should do better. Right now, I don’t have much confidence in their product.
Google search: https://share.google/aimode/eihDKXZJy94Z5lC1p
and it's beyond me to not think about doing this and instead exposing everyone and their neighbor to this exploit up front.
I'm certain this is even a felony in some legislations, rightfully so.
I am running this in production right now and it mitigates the attack, with no unexpected side-effects as far as I can see.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-linux-cop...
https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431/issues...
https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431/issues...
Basically: sudo grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=initcall_blacklist=algif_aead_init
sudo reboot
Copy Fail
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47952181